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A Game Theoretical Approach for Interference
Mitigation in Body-to-Body Networks
Amira Meharouech∗, Jocelyne Elias∗, Stefano Paris∗† and Ahmed Mehaoua∗
Abstract—In this paper, we consider a dynamic system com-
posed of several Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) inter-
acting with the surrounding environment, forming Body-to-Body
Networks (BBNs). In this dynamic BBN system, we analyze the
joint mutual and cross-technology interference problem due to
the utilization of a limited number of channels by different
transmission technologies (i.e., ZigBee and WiFi) sharing the
same radio spectrum. To this end, we propose a game theoretical
approach to address the problem of Interference Mitigation in
BBNs. Our approach considers a two-stage channel allocation
scheme: a BBN-stage for inter-WBANs’ communications and a
WBAN-stage for intra-WBAN communications. We demonstrate
that the proposed BBN-stage and WBAN-stage games admit
exact potential functions and develop best response algorithms
that converge fast to Nash equilibrium points. Finally, numerical
results show that the proposed approach is indeed efficient in
optimizing the channel allocations in BBNs while using different
transmission technologies.
Index Terms—Body-to-Body Networks, 2.4 GHz ISM band,
Interference Mitigation, Cross-Technology Interference, Channel
Allocation, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Body-to-Body Networks have recently emerged as promis-
ing solutions for the monitoring of people behavior and their
interaction with the surrounding environment [1]. BBNs may
represent a number of scenarios: (i) rescue teams in a disaster
area, (ii) groups of soldiers on the battlefield, and (iii) patients
in a healthcare center, whose Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBANs) interact with each other. The BBN consists of
several WBANs, which in turn are composed of sensor nodes
that are usually placed in the clothes, on the body or under the
skin [2]. These sensors collect information about the person
and send it to the sink (i.e., a Mobile Terminal (MT) or a
PDA), in order to be processed or relayed to other networks.
Due to the scarce wireless channel resources, many ex-
isting wireless technologies, like IEEE 802.11 (WiFi), IEEE
802.15.1 (Bluetooth) and IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee), are forced
to share the same unlicensed 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific
and Medical (ISM) band. Hence, mutual as well as cross-
technology interference may occur between these technolo-
gies. Furthermore, since WiFi transmission power can be 10 to
100 times higher than that of ZigBee, ZigBee communication
links can suffer significant performance degradation in terms
of data reliability and throughput. In addition to the previously
mentioned challenging issues, the mobility of WBANs in their
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surrounding environment and their interactions with each other
make the interference mitigation in body-to-body networks a
very interesting and mandatory problem to address. This is
indeed the focus of the paper.
Whilst a number of previous interference-aware studies have
been based upon power considerations [3], [4], others have
chosen alternative approaches [5], [6] to deal with this chal-
lenging problem in the design of WBANs. In [4] the authors
propose a distributed power control algorithm representing the
best tradeoff between energy and network utility. However,
they have not envisaged transmissions among WBANs and
have not considered precise assumptions concerning the used
transmission technology. Furthermore, several works have
investigated the interference mitigation problem with detailed
specifications of wireless technologies, especially WiFi and
ZigBee which are the most widespread ones in the WBAN
industry [7], [8]. The proposed solutions enable ZigBee links
to achieve high performance levels in the presence of heavy
WiFi interference, but almost all of them do not consider
the mobility feature of WBANs neither propose an SIR-based
utility functions for mutual and cross-technology interferences.
In [9], we have analyzed the interference mitigation issue
in a dynamic BBN system. The problem is formulated as
an optimization problem, proposing an extended interference
graph to model cross-technology conflicts. However, in the
present work, we address the interference mitigation problem
using concepts and mathematical tools from Game Theory,
while this problem has been tackled in [9] in a completely
centralized way.
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
propose a game theoretical approach for an interference-aware
channel allocation in BBNs. In our model, multiple WBANs
can interact with each other within a BBN, as well as with
other coexisting networks/BBNs, involving different access
technologies; this can lead to severe interference, which is
instead consistently mitigated by our proposed approach. The
main contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel game theoretical approach that con-
sists of two nested games (inter- and intra-WBANs), for
interference mitigation in BBNs.
• A detailed expression of Signal-to-Interference Ratio is
proposed to define the payoff function of the players,
showing the different interference components, namely
the co-channel, the mutual, and the cross-technology
interferences.
• We demonstrate that our games admit at least one pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) since the games have
exact potential functions and we develop best response
algorithms to compute the channel allocations, that con-
verge fast to NE solutions.
• We perform a thorough performance analysis of the BBN-
and WBAN-stage SIM games under different system
parameters.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the
BBN system model. Section III details the two-stage socially-
aware interference mitigation game theoretical approach, while
Section IV presents the best response algorithms. Section V
analyzes numerical results for the proposed games in several
BBN scenarios. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. BODY-TO-BODY SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider a multi-BBN scenario (as
illustrated in Figure 1) composed of a set N of WBANs
distributed over a set of coexisting BBNs, which are located in
the same geographical area (i.e., a medical center, a rest home
or a care home), and share the same unlicensed 2.4 GHz ISM
band. Let Cw and Cz denote, respectively, the set of WiFi and
ZigBee channels in this band. Each WBAN is equipped with a
wearable Mobile Terminal (MT)1, that uses both the 802.15.4
protocol (i.e., ZigBee) to communicate with the sensor nodes
within its WBAN, and the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard (i.e.,
WiFi) to create a backhaul infrastructure for inter-WBANs’
communications.
Since we are assuming that WBANs can move and interact
with their surrounding environment, we decide to divide the
operating time of the whole system into a set T of consecutive
epochs, and during each epoch t ∈ T we suppose that the net-
work topology and environment conditions do not change. The
set Lw(t) represents all WiFi unidirectional links established
by mobile terminals during the epoch t ∈ T ; Lw(t) may vary
between two consecutive epochs due to WBANs’ mobility.
On the contrary, the set Lz , which represents the ZigBee
unidirectional links used for intra-WBAN communication does
not change with time.
To summarize, our network model will focus on the follow-
ing relevant elements:
• Every single WBAN’s MT, muniequipped with one WiFi
antenna and one ZigBee antenna, should dispose of non
overlapping WiFi and ZigBee channels.
• No interference is present within a WBAN; we assume
a TDMA-based medium access control implemented in
each WBAN to deal with collisions.
• The interference between overlapping WiFi and ZigBee
channels is represented by the matrix A, of size |Cw| ×
|Cz|, whose element ac1c2 is a binary value: ac1c2 = 1
if WiFi channel c1 overlaps with ZigBee channel c2 (0
otherwise).
• The degree of interference between overlapping WiFi
channels is represented by the matrix W , of size |Cw| ×
|Cw|, whose element wc1c2 ∈ [0, 1] is a fractional value,
1The WBAN and his corresponding Mobile Terminal will be used inter-
changeably throughout the paper.
Figure 1: Three-BBN interfering scenario in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz
ISM band
defined in [10] as the ratio of the power spectral density
functions of the band-pass filters for channels c1 and c2.
• To preserve the network connectivity within the BBN, a
unique WiFi channel is required by each connex compo-
nent, i.e., the set of connected WBANs over WiFi links of
the same BBN referred to as sub-BBN. Such connectivity
is represented using the |Lw| × |Lw| matrix B, whose
element bij is a binary value: bij = 1 if WiFi links i and
j belong to the same sub-BBN (0 otherwise).
• Finally, the magnitude between WiFi and ZigBee trans-
mission power is large enough (i.e. pw >> pz) that it
could be used to compute algorithmic approximations.
We use the extended conflict graph Gc(Vc(t), Ec(t)) intro-
duced in our previous work [9], to model the mutual and cross-
technology interfering wireless links, such as:
• Vc(t): set of vertices corresponding to WiFi and ZigBee
communication links in the network, Vc(t) = Lw(t)∪Lz .
• Ec(t): set of edges corresponding to the interference
relationship among pairs of links.
The Interference issue and the SINR metric are tightly re-
lated. A few recent studies have dealt with SINR and employed
it as interference metric [4], [6] for WBANs, though, the noise
component is ever assimilated to the background white noise
power, which is insufficient for a BBN context since numerous
environmental and human parameters are involved. Thus, we
prefer investigate the noise component in a future work, and
in this paper, we focus only on the interference metric (SIR).
III. TWO-STAGE SOCIALLY-AWARE INTERFERENCE
MITIGATION (SIM): A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH
In this section, we first define the basic notation and
parameters used hereafter, and then we describe in detail the
proposed socially-aware interference mitigation game theoret-
ical approach.
The lack of a centralized control and access priority to the
radio spectrum, in addition to the restricted knowledge of net-
work information, motivate us to employ at WBAN-stage local
interaction games, in which players (or WBANs) consider their
own payoffs as well as those of their neighbors, so as to
optimize their strategies while relying on their surrounding
network information. Besides, at the BBN-stage game, each
group of WBANs (i.e., each sub-BBN) is represented by a
special player (a delegate or a leader of the group) who
decides which WiFi channel to choose. Indeed, to ensure
network connectivity all WBANs within the same sub-BBN
should be tuned to the same WiFi channel. Therefore, we
consider this special player that acts on behalf of the entire
sub-BBN. To this end, we consider in this work a two-stage
socially-aware interference mitigation scheme. Each player is
represented by a couple of links (l, h), such that l ∈ Lw(t)
and h ∈ Lz are a WiFi and a ZigBee link corresponding
to a given WBAN i ∈ N assimilated to its MT. At time
epoch t ∈ T , each player chooses a couple of strategies
(xlc1(t), y
h
c2
(t)) ⊂ Sl(t) ∪ Sh(t), such as xlc1 is the strategy
to allocate a WiFi channel c1 ∈ C
w to WiFi link l, and yhc2 is
the strategy to allocate a ZigBee channel c2 ∈ C
z to ZigBee
link h. Sl(t) and Sh(t) are the sets of the channel allocation
strategies of links l and h of WBAN i, respectively.
A. BBN-stage SIM Game
In order to assign a single WiFi channel to each sub-
BBN, we opt for a BBN-stage SIM game so that each set of
communicating WBANs, forming a sub-BBN, are represented
by a specific WiFi link. The representative WiFi link is situated
in the center of the sub-BBN and plays the role of the delegate,
and the other WBANs belonging to the same sub-BBN will
be allocated the same WiFi channel.
We build the extended conflict graph and we assume that
each WBAN has information only about his sub-BBN un-
derlying WBANs, through the exchange of polling messages.
Thus, we can identify for each WBAN, the set of interfering
neighbors at time epoch t ∈ T (i.e., the set of edges between
a link of such WBAN and transmission links of the others).
Let Wl denote the set of links interfering with WiFi link l:
Wl(t) = {k ∈ L
w(t) : (l, k) ⊂ Ec(t)} ∪ {j ∈ L
z : (l, j) ⊂ Ec(t)}
Thereby, we can define the BBN-stage game as follows:
• Players: the set of BBNs represented by their delegates,
the player is assimilated to its WiFi link l.
• Strategies/actions: sl(t) = xlc1(t), strategy to choose a
WiFi channel c1 to WiFi link l from C
w.
• Utility function: To ensure a realistic representation of the
game, we use the worst SIR values perceived by the two
radio interfaces, WiFi and ZigBeeIn Equation (1), we ex-
tend the SIR expression of the player l ∈ Lw to consider
interfering transmitters using different technologies:
SIRw(xlc1 )(t) = 10log(
gllp
l
w
Iwc1 (x
l
c1
) + Iw(xlc1 ) + I
wz(xlc1 )
), (1)
where
Iwc1 (x
l
c1
) : Co-channel interference from WiFi links of other
sub-BBNs (bkl = 0) sharing channel c1 with WiFi link l.
Iwc1 (x
l
c1
) =
∑
k∈Lw
bkl=0
xlc1x
k
c1
glkp
k
w (2)
Iw(xlc1 ) : Mutual interference from WiFi links of other sub-
BBNs (bkl = 0) using WiFi channels that overlap with c1.
Iw(xlc1 ) =
∑
k∈Lw
bkl=0
(
∑
c∈Cw
c6=c1
wc1cx
l
c1
xkc )glkp
k
w, (3)
Iwz(xlc1 ) : Cross-interference from ZigBee links, using Zig-
Bee channels other than c2, overlapping with c1.
Iwz(xlc1 ) =
∑
k∈Lz
k 6=h
(
∑
c∈Cz
ac1cx
l
c1
ykc )glkp
k
z ; (4)
gll is the channel gain of link l, glk the link gain from the
transmitter k to the receiver l, pkw and p
k
z are the WiFi and
ZigBee transmit power, respectively.
Note that in expression (4) we use the binary parameter
ac1c2 to model the cross-technology interference instead of
the fractional wc1c2 used in Equation (3) for mutual WiFi
interference. In fact, although in the literature the interference
of the IEEE 802.11b has been modeled as an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) to the ZigBee signal, the authors
in [11] measured a packet loss of 99, 75% up to 100% in
WBANs used for blood analysis and ECG sensing when a
video streaming is executed over an interfering WiFi channel.
Therefore, due to the tight constraints on WBANs’ trans-
missions reliability, we consider the worst effect caused by
WiFi interference on ZigBee communications, using the binary
parameter ac1c2 ∈ {0, 1}.
1) Convergence of BBN-stage game: Nash Equilibrium
Having defined the BBN stage of the SIM game, we then
demonstrate that such game indeed admits at least one pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, we first define the utility
function of player l as follows:
Uw(x
l
c1
) = 10log(gllp
l
w)− 10log(IF
w
l (x
l
c1
))
where IFw
l
(xlc1 ), denoted as the WiFi Interference Function
of player l, is the total interference suffered by link l when
playing strategy xlc1 , and is expressed as follows:
IFwl (x
l
c1
) = Iwc (x
l
c1
) + Iw(xlc1 ) + I
wz(xlc1 )
=
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
∑
c∈Cw
f(xlc1 , x
k
c ) +
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
∑
c∈Cz
c6=c2
g(xlc1 , y
j
c)
or function of the strategies:
IFwl (s
l) =
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
f(sl, sk) +
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
g(sl, sj)
where:
f(sl, sk) =


0, sl 6= sk and WiFi channel c1 of link l
does not overlap with WiFi channel of link k.
glkp
k
w, s
l = sk
wc1cglkp
k
w, s
l 6= sk and WiFi channel c1 of link l
overlaps with WiFi channel of link k.
and:
g(sl, sj) =


0, WiFi channel c1 of link l does not overlap
with ZigBee channel of link j.
gljp
j
z , WiFi channel c1 of link l overlaps with
ZigBee channel of link j.
Due to the property of monotone transformation, if the
modified game with utility IFw is a potential game, then
the original BBN-stage SIM game with utility Uw is also a
potential game with the same potential function. Then, the
BBN-stage SIM game (G1) is expressed as follows: (G1) :
min
xl
c1
∈Sl(t)
IFw
l
(xlc1 , x
−l
c1 ) ∀l ∈ L
w
s.t.
∑
c∈Cw
xlc = 1 ∀l ∈ L
w(t) (5)
xlc1 ∈ {0, 1} ∀l ∈ L
w(t), c1 ∈ C
w, (6)
For convenience, we designate by -l all the players be-
longing to Wl. Constraint (5) forces the assignment of a
single WiFi channel for a single WiFi link for each player.
The convergence of the BBN-stage SIM game to a Nash
equilibrium is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 1: The BBN-stage SIM game G1 is an exact
potential game.
Proof: we construct the potential function as follows:
Φw(si, s−i) =
1
2
∑
i∈Lw
∑
k∈Wi∩Lw
f(si, sk) +
∑
i∈Lw
∑
j∈Wi∩Lz
g(si, sj)
Therefore, when player l ∈ Lw changes its action at time
epoch t ∈ T , from sl to sˆl, the variation of the potential function
subsequent to this player’s strategy change is given by:
Φw(sl, s−l)− Φw(sˆl, s−l) =
1
2
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
∑
k∈Wi∩Lw
f(si, sk) +
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
∑
j∈Wi∩Lz
g(si, sj) (7)
−
1
2
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
∑
k∈Wi∩Lw
f(si, sk)−
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
∑
j∈Wi∩Lz
g(si, sj) (8)
+
1
2
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
f(si, sl)−
1
2
∑
i∈Lw
i 6=l
f(si, sˆl) (k = l)
+
1
2
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
f(sl, sk) +
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
g(sl, sj) (i = l)
−
1
2
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
f(sˆl, sk)−
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
g(sˆl, sj) (i = l)
We can easily see that (7)+(8)=0. On the other hand, since
each player has only interference with his neighboring set,
then {i ∈ Lw : i 6= l} = {k ∈ Wl ∩ Lw}, and we assume that
function f is symmetric so as we consider symmetric channel
gains (glk = gkl if bkl = 0), therefore:
Φw(sl, s−l)− Φw(sˆl, s−l) =
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
f(sl, sk) +
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
g(sl, sj)
−
∑
k∈Wl∩L
w
f(sˆl, sk)−
∑
j∈Wl∩L
z
g(sˆl, sj) = IFwl (s
l, s−l)− IFwl (sˆ
l, s−l)
Accordingly we prove that, when a delegate l ∈ Lw
deviates from a strategy sl to an alternate strategy sˆl, the
change in the exact potential function Φw exactly mirrors
the change in l’s utility. Therefore the SIM game is an exact
potential game. 
Thereby, we can rely on the following theorem [12] to
confirm the existence of a Nash equilibrium to our game.
Theorem 2: Every potential game has at least one pure Nash
equilibrium, namely the strategy sl that minimizes Φw(sl).
B. WBAN-stage SIM Game
We now consider the WBAN-stage game, where each
WBAN will be assigned a ZigBee channel that guarantees
the minimal interference with his neighbors.
1) ZigBee local interaction game
Similarly to the BBN stage, denote Zh as the set of
neighbors of ZigBee link h, using the conflict graph:
Zh(t) = {j ∈ L
z : (h, j) ⊂ Ec(t)} ∪ {k ∈ Lw(t) : (h, k) ⊂ Ec(t)}
Hence, we can define the local interaction game of the
WBAN stage as follows:
• Players: set N of WBANs. For the WBAN-stage, the
player is assimilated to his ZigBee link h.
• Strategies/actions: sh(t) = yhc2(t), strategy to choose a
ZigBee channel c2 to ZigBee link h from Cz .
• Utility function: is, similarly to BBN stage, function of
the SIR considering the ZigBee interface which is used
for intra-WBAN communications, given by:
SIRz(yhc2 )(t) = 10log(
ghhp
h
z
Iwz(yhc2 ) + I
z(yhc2 )
), (9)
Iwz(yhc2 ) represents the cross-technology interference caused
by mobile terminals using WiFi channels that interfere with
the ZigBee channel c2 on which WBAN link h is tuned.
Iwz(yhc2 ) =
∑
k∈Lw
bkl=0
∑
c∈Cw
acc2x
k
cy
h
c2
ghkp
k
w(t). (10)
Iz(yhc2 ) accounts for the co-channel interference of nearby
WBANs sharing the same ZigBee channel c2 of player h.
Iz(yhc2 ) =
∑
k∈Lz
ykc2y
h
c2
ghkp
k
z (t). (11)
Conversely to the BBN stage (Equation (1)), in Equation (9)
only cross and co-channel interference components are con-
sidered at the denominator, since all ZigBee channels are
completely orthogonal among each other, i.e. no mutual inter-
ference is there. In case of sharing the same ZigBee channel,
i.e., expression (11), the corresponding experimental scenario
in [11] measures 18% of packet losses. Therefore, we model
our game so that selecting different and non-overlapping
ZigBee channels for intra-WBAN communications emerges
as the best strategy for all players. Yet, we consider local
interaction behaviors among players interacting within the
same neighboring set, which is translated in the utility function
by a local cooperation quantity as a tradeoff to the player
selfish attitude. Thus, we define the utility function of player h
for the WBAN-stage game as follows:
Uz(y
h
c2
) = SIRz(yhc2 ) +
∑
k∈Zh
SIRz(ykc )
= 10log(ghhp
h
z ) +
∑
k∈Zh
10log(gkkp
k
z )− IF
z
h (y
h
c2
)
where: IF zh (y
h
c2
) = Ih(y
h
c2
) +
∑
k∈Zh
Ik(y
h
c2
)
and: Ik(yhc2 ) = 10log(I
wz(ykc ) + I
z(ykc )) , ∀c ∈ C
z : ykc = 1
Ik(y
h
c2
) is the total interference suffered by link k of a neigh-
boring WBAN when link h plays strategy yhc2 .
As in [13], using the monotone transformation property, the
WBAN-stage SIM game is expressed as follows:
(G2) : min
yh
c2
∈Sh(t)
IF z
h
(yhc2 , y
−h
c2 ) ∀h ∈ L
z
s.t.
∑
c∈Cz
yhc = 1 ∀h ∈ L
z(t) (12)
yhc ∈ {0, 1} ∀h ∈ L
z , c ∈ Cz (13)
Constraint (12) forces the assignment of a single ZigBee
channel for a ZigBee link, for each player.
2) Convergence of WBAN-stage game: Nash Equilibrium
The property of the proposed local interaction game is
characterized by the following theorem:
Theorem 4: G2 is an exact potential game which has at least
one pure strategy NE, and the optimal solution of his potential
function constitutes a pure strategy NE.
Proof: we construct the potential function as follows:
Φz(sh, s−h) =
∑
k∈Lz
Ik(s
h, s−h)
if we compute the variation of the utility function when
player h ∈ Lz changes its action at time epoch t ∈ T , from
sh to sˆh, we obtain:
IF zh (s
h, s−h)− IF zh (sˆ
h, s−h) =
Ih(s
h, s−h)− Ih(sˆ
h, s−h) +
∑
k∈Zh
[Ik(s
h, s−h)− Ik(sˆ
h, s−h)]
On the other hand, the variation of the potential function
subsequent to this player’s strategy change is given by:
Φz(sh, s−h)− Φz(sˆh, s−h) =
∑
k∈Lz
Ik(s
h, s−h)−
∑
k∈Lz
Ik(sˆ
h, s−h)
= Ih(s
h, s−h)− Ih(sˆ
h, s−h) +
∑
k∈Zh
[Ik(s
h, s−h)− Ik(sˆ
h, s−h)]
+
∑
k∈Lz\Zh
k 6=h
[Ik(s
h, s−h)− Ik(sˆ
h, s−h)]
Yet, with the local cooperative nature of WBAN-stage game,
h player’s action only affects players in its interference range,
thus we have:
Ik(s
h, s−h)− Ik(sˆ
h, s−h) = 0 ∀k ∈ Lz \ Zh, k 6= h
This leads to the following equation:
IF z
h
(sh, s−h)− IF z
h
(sˆh, s−h) = Φz(sh, s−h)− Φz(sˆh, s−h)
Accordingly we prove that, when a player h ∈ Lz deviates
from a strategy sh to an alternate strategy sˆh, the change in
the exact potential function Φz exactly mirrors the change in
h’s utility. Therefore the WBAN-stage SIM game is an exact
potential game.
IV. BEST-RESPONSE BBN/WBAN-STAGE SIM
ALGORITHM (BR-SIM)
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm that
implements a best response dynamics for our proposed SIM
game theoretical approach. Indeed, potential games have two
appealing properties: they admit at least one pure-strategy NE
which can be obtained through a best-response dynamics car-
ried out by each player, and they have the Finite Improvement
Property (FIP) [14], which ensures the convergence to a NE
within a finite number of iterations.
BR-SIM is processed at time epoch t ∈ T : it starts
by forming the coalitions of sub-BBNs whose delegates are
representative WiFi links situated in the center with symmetric
gains. The delegates and the underlying WBANs are initial-
ized to random WiFi and ZigBee channels with respect to
the connectivity criterion within BBNs. Then, the algorithm
iteratively examines whether there exists any player that is
unsatisfied, and in such case a greedy selfish step is taken so
that such player l changes his current strategy sl(τ), τ < t, to
a better strategy sl(τ + 1) with respect to the current action
profile of all other players, as follows:
sl(τ + 1) = argmin
sl∈Cw
IFwl (s
l, s−l) s.t. (14)
s−l = {s1(τ + 1), s2(τ + 1), ..., sl−1(τ + 1), sl+1(τ), ..., s|L
w(t)|(τ)}
where s1, s2..., sl−1 have been updated to their best-
responses at iteration τ + 1 and do not change from their
selected strategies during the current iteration.
Alike the WiFi Best-response procedure, players update it-
eratively the ZigBee channels that minimize their Interference
Functions, with respect to their WiFi channels selected at the
BBN- (or WiFi-) stage step. Thus, for a ZigBee player h, the
strategy domain of the ZigBee channel selection process is
delimited to the set of available ZigBee channels Czh(t), i.e.,
not overlapping with his assigned WiFi channel at time epoch
t. Therefore, the best-response strategy of ZigBee player h is
expressed by:
sh(τ + 1) = argmin
sh∈Cz
h
(t)
IF zh (s
h, s−h) s.t. (15)
s−h = {s1(τ + 1), s2(τ + 1), ..., sh−1(τ + 1), sh+1(τ), . . . , s|L
z(t)|(τ)}
Due to the FIP property, such algorithm is guaranteed to
converge in a finite number of iterations to a BBN-stage NE,
and then to a local interaction ZigBee NE where no player
has an incentive to deviate from his best-response choice.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section illustrates and discusses the numerical results
obtained in different network scenarios, using the INRIA
Scilab software package. The mobile WBANs, which number
varies in the range [20,40], are randomly deployed in a
1000× 1000m area, and divided into four overlapping BBNs.
The mobility is simulated using the common random waypoint
model. We consider the first five overlapping WiFi channels
of the ISM band (Cw = {1, 5}) and the whole band of ZigBee
channels (Cz = {11, 26}) in order to simulate the WiFi mutual
interference and the cross-technology scenarios. To compute
channel gains, we refer to the BBN-specific channel gain
model in [15]. The WiFi and ZigBee transmission powers are
set to 100 mW and 1 mW, respectively.
To show the effectiveness of our distributed solution, we
evaluate the effect of the WBANs density on the dynamics of
the BR-SIM channel selection algorithm. More specifically,
we measure the WiFi and ZigBee signal-to-interference ratios
for each BBN, proving that the BR-SIM algorithm guarantees
a fair share of wireless resources.
The curves on Fig.2 and Fig.3 illustrate respectively the
dynamics of the BR-SIM algorithm for different BBN den-
sities, namely for the number of WBANs N=20 and N=40.
Each figure displays the evolution of the average signal-to-
interference ratios for BBN and WBAN stages. As expected,
increasing the BBN density results obviously in increasing the
network overall interference and then the number of iterations
to reach an equilibrium.
Besides, we notice at the Nash Equilibrium that the worst
WiFi SIR (21 dB for N=20 and 9 dB for N=40), measured
with the standard transmission power of 20 dBm (100 mW)
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Figure 2: Dynamics of BR-SIM algorithm by each BBN for
a density of N=20 WBANs
is always above the receiver sensitivity of most commercial
cards (the lowest receiver sensitivity for the Atheros chipset
is −95 dB), even considering other effects like fading and
thermal noise. The same conclusions are observed for the
worst ZigBee SIR measured by all four BBNs (i.e., the WBAN
that experiences the worst SIR in a BBN), which varies
between 25 and 30 dB for N=20 and N=40 respectively.
Note that the worst SIR measured at the ZigBee receiver is
higher than the value measured at the WiFi receiver due to
the restricted number of overlapping WiFi channels used in
the simulation in order to enable mutual and cross-technology
interferences, thus resulting in conflicting transmissions using
the WiFi technology. Naturally, within a BBN only WiFi
transmissions coming from surrounding BBNs are consid-
ered in the computation of the WiFi interference, since we
assume the utilization of a coordination scheme for intra-
BBN communications, whereas the ZigBee interface of any
WBAN experiences both intra-BBN and inter-BBN interfer-
ence. Thereby, further experiments with non-overlapping WiFi
channels would reverse the previous conclusions and assess
higher values of WiFi SIR versus ZigBee SIR.
Yet, the performance of BR-SIM algorithm is ensured since
it provides a rather fair, socially-aware channel allocation, so
that both WiFi and Zigbee signal-to-interference ratios tend
to be quite close to a mean value at the Nash Equilibrium.
Nevertheless, a perceptible decrease in the range of SIR values
(mainly SIRz), at the NE point, is observed when the density of
the WBANs jumps to upper values, thus constant segments of
the curves are tightly close. Indeed, higher densities occasion
a most fair spreading of players over the neighboring BBNs,
that will suffer from relatively fair interference environment.
This explains why, for lower densities, the average SIR values
by each BBN are spread out over a larger range of values.
Finally, it can be observed that the BR-SIM algorithm
quickly converges to a stable operational point in few iter-
ations, thus representing a practical solution for interference
mitigation in realistic BBN scenarios. In particular, all BBNs
converge to their best WiFi and ZigBee channel allocations in
at most 3 and 5 iterations, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we studied the distributed interference mitiga-
tion problem in BBN scenarios from a game theoretic perspec-
tive. In particular, our work makes three main contributions.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of BR-SIM algorithm by each BBN for
a density of N=40 WBANs
First, we formulate the problem as a game considering the
SIR, which accurately models the channel capacity that can be
achieved in the presence of mutual and cross-technology inter-
ference. Secondly, we study the properties of our game proving
the existence of a Nash Equilibrium, which represents channel
allocations that minimize the mutual and cross-technology
interference. Third, we propose a two-stage algorithm (called
BR-SIM) based on the best-response approach to compute the
Nash Equilibria in a distributed fashion. Finally, we evaluate
our approach in realistic BBN scenarios in order to show that
the BR-SIM algorithm converges quickly and achieves feasible
values for the utility functions.
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